




Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt
Lawrence Solan
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
78 Tex. L. Rev. 105 (1999)
Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt
Lawrence M. Solan*
I. Introduction
This Article asks whether the proof beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard is the best way to promote the values our system of criminal justice
claims to venerate. The results of the inquiry point to a single conclusion:
standard reasonable doubt instructions focus the jury on the defendant's
ability to produce alternatives to the government's case, and thereby shift
the burden of proof to the defendant. In fact, empirical studies and
linguistic analysis strongly suggest that it is more difficult to establish proof
by clear and convincing evidence than it is to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, even though our system regards the former as reflecting
a lighter burden.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been the government's burden
in criminal cases for virtually this country's entire history.' Although the
Supreme Court did not hold this standard to be a constitutional imperative
until 1970,2 its use has not been a matter of any serious controversy. The
phrase developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries not
as a value in itself, but rather as a fair way to express the sentiment that
only when the members of a jury are very certain of a defendant's guilt
should they convict. Some two hundred years later, we still use the same
expression, and we profess to use it for the same reason.
Most debate in judicial opinions and in the scholarly literature has
focused on whether reasonable doubt should be defined for the jury, and,
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Marshall and Richard Posner, Joe Cecil of the Federal Judicial Center, and Professors Ursula Bentele,
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Johnson-Laird, Gary Minda, Bob Pitier, Peter Tiersma, Edwin Williams and Steve Winter for valuable
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1. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
2. See id. at 364.
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if so, how it should be defined.3 Although there is great disagreement
among those who engage in this debate, all players share an important
assumption: Our system of criminal justice comes blessed with a ready-
made standard for the government to meet, and all we have to do is to
elucidate it a bit to make sure that jurors get it right. This Article
challenges that assumption. It suggests that we revise our conception of
the government's burden of proof to focus more clearly on what the gov-
ernment must establish. The Federal Judicial Center's model instruction,
which tells the jury that the prosecution must leave them "firmly
convinced" of a defendant's guilt before they may convict,4 comes close
to the mark. By emphasizing the government's task-and not the
defendant's-it goes a long way toward ensuring that the burden of proof
in criminal cases remains where it belongs: on the government. New
Jersey's instruction, which requires that the jury be "firmly convinced" of
the defendant's guilt, does an even better job.5
The firmly convinced standard is virtually identical to the standard
used in France,6 and is similar to that used by those English courts which,
frustrated by a lack of universal understanding of reasonable doubt, have
abandoned that term altogether.' Nonetheless, despite the availability of
instructions that appropriately place the burden on the government to prove
its case with strong evidence, very few jurisdictions use them. I argue that
this situation should be corrected-whether by appellate courts, legislatures,
or jury reform commissions.
This approach to the burden of proof in criminal cases is seemingly
at odds with prevailing popular thought about the criminal justice system.
The sense that the system is soft on criminal defendants is pervasive in our
3. Compare Note, ReasonableDoubt: AnArgumentAgainstDefinition, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1955,
1955 (1995) (concluding that "courts should not attempt to define the term [reasonable doubt] in
conveying the reasonable doubt concept to juries"), with Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury
Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical Concept, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 677, 678 (1995) (arguing that
"because reasonable doubt is a term of art it should be defined for the jury"), and Henry A. Diamond,
Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, orNot to Define, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1716, 1716 (1990) ("[J]ury
instructions defining reasonable doubt should always be given in criminal trials and are constitutionally
required when requested by the defendant or the jury."). See also Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable
Doubt: How in the World is it Defined?, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 195 (1997) (explaining
various approaches to and definitions of reasonable doubt).
4. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PATrERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 21, at 28 (1988).
5. See State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1251 (N.J. 1996) (instructing courts to define reasonable
doubt as that proof which "leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt"). This case is
discussed more fully infra note 53.
6. See THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, art.353, at 172 (Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans., rev. ed. 1988) (requiring the
court to ask the jury: "Are you thoroughly convinced?").
7. See Walters v. Queen [1969] 2 App. Cas. 26, 30 (P.C. 1969) (appeal taken from Jam.)
(upholding the validity of a jury charge given by a lower court that had jettisoned the reasonable doubt
standard).
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society. A substantial majority of those polled believe the courts to be
responsible in part for high crime rates,' even though such rates have been
falling. 9 O.J. Simpson's acquittal, moreover, still lingers in the minds of
many as evidence that the judicial system is too lenient.' 0 The perceived
stringency of the reasonable doubt standard is considered one of the
reasons for Simpson's exoneration." I suggest that this critique is also
misfocused. The problem is not that the reasonable doubt standard is gene-
rally too hard for the government to meet when its case is strong. On the
contrary, much of this Article will show that the standard generally
requires less of the government in criminal cases than is commonly
believed.
This Article will also address how the reasonable doubt standard can
lead, in certain circumstances, to the acquittal of guilty defendants. The
reasonable doubt standard does encourage defense attorneys to direct a
jury's attention to remote contingencies when the government has presented
a strong case. Sometimes, especially when they have substantial resources,
defense attorneys will be successful in using this strategy to gain the
acquittal of a defendant even when the government's case is convincing.
The approach espoused here should help to remedy that problem as well.
In Part II, I discuss the values, both cultural and historical, that
underlie the reasonable doubt standard. A criminal justice system that risks
freeing the guilty in order to avoid convicting the innocent is generally
regarded as a hallmark of a decent civilization. The requirement that the
government prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is one way
our society promotes this ideal. I summarize the history of the reasonable
8. See, e.g., Laura B. Meyers, Bringing the Offender to Heel: Views of the Criminal Courts, in
AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 46, 53 (Timothy J.
Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (finding that 67 % of those polled were "concerned about
courts that do not reduce crime"). One recent study showed barely half the people surveyed (56%) to
agree with Blackstone's famous statement that it is better to allow ten guilty people to go free than to
convict one innocent person by mistake. See Robert J. Boeckmann & Tom R. Tyler, Commonsense
Justice and Inclusion Within the Moral Community: When Do People Receive Procedural Protections
From Others?, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 362, 366 (1997).
9. See Marlene Cimons, Study Finds Murder Rate at 30-Year Low Trends, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2117172 (citing statistics indicating that the national murder rate was at
a three decade low and that the rate of violent crime overall was at the lowest level in 24 years).
10. For a more thorough discussion, see Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson
Stories: Behavioral Scientists' Reflections on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James
Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 957, 958 (1996) (offering a "psychological post-mortem on the
Simpson trial verdict that explicates the jurors' decision-making processes") and Mulrine, supra note
3, at 195-96, as well as the voluminous discussions in the popular press.
11. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 69 (1996) (suggesting that the "exacting" nature of the reasonable doubt
standard was a possible explanation for the jury's verdict in the Simpson case); Steven M. Cooper,
People v. Simpson: Some Thoughts on Aberrance, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 165, 167 (1997) ("If there was
reasonable doubt in the Simpson trial, how could there ever be a criminal case without it?").
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doubt standard in this light. I then present three approaches that courts use
today. Some courts define what a reasonable doubt is, others present the
reasonable doubt standard to the jury but leave it unexplained, and other
courts tell the jury of the government's burden in a manner that focuses
more on what the government must prove and less on the types of doubts
that require acquittal. The approach that focuses more on the government's
burden has, I argue, the best chance of leading to convictions when the
government's case is strong and to acquittals when the government's case
is weak.
In Part III, I discuss both real-world data and a number of experi-
mental studies designed to test how jurors apply various burden of proof
instructions. These studies indicate that typical reasonable doubt instruc-
tions are likely to lead to conviction of defendants in cases in which
favorable evidence is evenly divided between the government and the
defendant, and that a rather low probability of guilt is needed to meet the
standard for most jurors. In one such study, about one-third of jurors who
had just participated in a criminal trial actually agreed that reasonable
doubt requires that the defendant prove her innocence once the government
has come forward with evidence of guilt.' When different instructions
are compared in some of these experiments, the "firmly convinced" stan-
dard that focuses on the government's burden alone results in high convic-
tion rates for cases in which the government's evidence is strong and much
lower conviction rates when the evidence against a defendant is equivocal.
Moreover, some of these studies suggest that the supposedly weaker clear
and convincing evidence standard is actually tougher to meet than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Using analytical tools developed by linguists, cognitive psychologists,
and philosophers, I examine in Part IV the expression "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" with the goals of explaining the empirical results
described in Part III and determining whether that expression is likely to
foster the values discussed in Part II. Close analysis reveals several
problems. First, the expression misfocuses the jury on the extent to which
the defense has created doubt. It says absolutely nothing about how strong
the government's case has to be. This increases the likelihood that the
government will win when it brings a case which is weak, but for which
the defendant presents no answer-possibly because she knows nothing
about the crime. Second, the reasonable doubt standard cannot overcome
prototype effects. People tend to categorize new things and events with
respect to mental models that they have already formed. If conviction of
a crime fits the facts better than acquittal, it is extremely difficult to
overcome the desire to match the facts with the better of the two models,
12. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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even if the case is not very strong. Third, "doubt" is what linguists and
philosophers call a verb of propositional attitude. Such verbs, which
include "think" and "believe," are best understood in terms of "possible
world" semantics. This means that the process of doubting is an imagi-
native one. Therefore, any instructions that tell jurors not to consider
"speculative" doubts are really telling the jurors not to consider any doubts
at all. In contrast, telling the jurors that the government has the burden of
leaving them firmly convinced that the defendant has committed every ele-
ment of the crime goes a long way to remedy these problems. Part V is
a brief conclusion.
II. The Standard of Proof In Criminal Cases
A. Who Should Be Convicted of Crimes?
The answer to this question is simple: Those who commit crimes
should be convicted of them. Those who do not commit crimes should not
be charged at all. If they are charged, then they should be acquitted. The
problem, of course, is that we are not always certain in advance about the
defendant's guilt, and often are never certain. 3 As Justice Harlan
explained in his famous concurrence in In re Winship:14
[I]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts
of some earlier event, the fact finder cannot acquire unassailably
accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the fact finder
can acquire is a belief of what probably happened. The intensity of
this belief-the degree to which a fact finder is convinced that a
given act actually occurred-can, of course, vary. In this regard, a
standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the fact finder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication. Although the phrases "preponderance of the evidence"
and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" are quantitatively imprecise,
they do communicate to the finder of fact different notions
concerning the degree of confidence he is expected to have in the
correctness of his factual conclusions.' 5
Harlan regarded the much more onerous reasonable doubt standard as the
correct one for criminal cases because of a "fundamental value deter-
mination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than
13. For a discussion of this point in the context of the Fourth Amendment, see Sherry F. Colb,
Innocence, Privacy and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1456,
1462 (1996) (arguing that "the Fourth Amendment is a right of the innocent and the guilty, but it is
not exactly the same right for both").
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
15. Id. at 370.
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to let a guilty man go free." 6 Putting it somewhat differently, Justice
Brennan said in his majority opinion in the same case: "It is also important
in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a cri-
minal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty.' 1 7  This, according to Brennan, is because our society
values "the good name and freedom of every individual." 8 Eight years
later, writing for a unanimous court in Addington v. Texas, 9 Chief Justice
Burger expressed the same sentiment: "In the administration of criminal
justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.
This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the
state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt."'
These ideas are old: they derive from seventeenth century
thought." Most widely quoted is William Blackstone's famous maxim,
"it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer."22 The expression "proof beyond reasonable doubt," however,
did not become widely used until the late eighteenth or early nineteenth
century, and until the latter part of the nineteenth century courts had not
reached agreement on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the universal
expression of the concept.23  While some of the history is
16. Id. at 372.
17. Id. at 364.
18. Id.
19. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
20. Id. at 423-24.
21. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 40 (1991); Anthony A. Morano, A
Reexamination ofthe Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 513-15 (1975)
(both tracing the rule's philosophical origins to late seventeenth century England); see also Theodore
Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 299, 299-301 (1959)
(tracing the origins of the reasonable doubt rule to the resolution of religious conflicts during and after
the Reformation).
22. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358 (photo. reprint 1978) (9th ed. 1783). Other
versions of this maxim have claimed various ideal numbers of false acquittals to avoid convicting a
single innocent person. This number ranges from 5 (Hale) to 20 (Fortescue). See John Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Faconding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1077 n. 11(1968).
23. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, proof beyond all reasonable doubt was the most
popular version. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 270 (1827) (stating that a state law should be
presumed valid until a violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt); The
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 340 (1822) (noting that the burden of proof rests on the claimant,
and that an absence of proof gives rise to the presumption that the claimant's assertions are untrue);
Spurr v. Pearson, 22 F. Cas. 1011, 1015 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 13,268) (noting that the guilt of
parties is to be established beyond all reasonable doubt). One variant used proof beyond any reasonable
doubt. See White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 290 (1845); Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. Co. v.
Stimpson, 39 U.S. 448, 460 (1840); Maisonnaire v. Keating, 16 F. Cas. 513, 517 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815) (No. 8978) (each applying a "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard). Other courts used the
naked, "proof beyond reasonable doubt." See United States v. The Brig Burdett, 34 U.S. 682, 690
(1835); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 78 (1821); United States v. Haswell, 26 F. Cas. 218, 219
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controversial,24 Justice O'Connor summarizes the standard account in her
majority opinion in Victor v. Nebraska.2s In essence, seventeenth century
thinkers, influenced heavily by John Locke, developed an epistemology that
differentiated among various kinds of evidence. Demonstrative evidence,
experienced first hand through sensory experience, was considered the most
reliable. Indirect evidence, from the reports of witnesses, was called
"moral evidence," and was considered less reliable.26 The expression
"moral certainty," which we still hear in some reasonable doubt instruc-
tions today, essentially meant "the highest degree of certitude based on
such evidence."27 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt was equated with
moral certainty.' In more recent times, the Supreme Court has described
the reasonable doubt standard itself in similar terms: "[B]y impressing
upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of
the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our
society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself."29 A
unanimous Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to these values in
1993, when it held that a constitutionally deficient instruction on the
meaning of reasonable doubt cannot be subjected to harmless error
analysis.3°
For the present, I would like to accept all of these statements as given.
That is, we use the expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" because
(C.C.D. Vt. 1800) (No. 15,324) (all requiring a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard). Only
occasionally do we see proof beyond a reasonable doubt during this time period. See Prevost v. Gratz,
19 U.S. 481, 498 (1821); United States v. Hewson, 26 F. Cas. 303, 309 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No.
15,360) (both requiring proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"). For reasons discussed in Part IV, infra
note 158 and accompanying text, these differences reflect significant changes between early
conceptualizations of the government's burden of proof and modem ones.
24. Compare SHAPIRO, supra note 21 (arguing that "beyond a reasonable doubt" was intended to
require the highest degree of certainty), with Morano, supra note 21, at 519, 527 (arguing that "beyond
a reasonable doubt" replaced the tougher standard, "beyond all doubt," in order to make convictions
easier). It is not entirely clear that these positions are inconsistent. First, Shapiro relies on English
cases, Morano on American cases. See Morano, supra note 21, at 519 (discussing the "development
of the reasonable doubt rule in America"); Shapiro, supra note 21, at xii ("My primary focus is on
early modem England . . . ."). Second, if the goal is to convict only when one is as certain as one
can expect oneself to be in a world in which nothing is certain, then "proof beyond all doubt" really
does not accurately reflect the then-current epistemology.
25. 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
26. See Boyd v. Gosser, 82 So. 758, 761 (Fla. 1918) (categorizing demonstrative evidence as
evidence of the highest rank" and noting that the value of moral evidence depends "upon veracity on
the one hand and credulity upon the other").
27. Victor, 511 U.S. at 11.
28. See id. at 12 ("Proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' ... is proof 'to a moral certainty,' as
distinguished from an absolute certainty. As applied to a judicial trial for crime, the two phrases are
synonymous and equivalent; ... each signifies such proof as satisfies the judgment and consciences
of the jury, as reasonable men .... ") (quoting Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1, 24 (1875)).
29. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
30. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-82 (1993).
Texas Law Review [Vol. 78:105
we believe that the government should be required to prove its case so
strongly that the evidence leaves the jury with the highest degree of
certitude based on such evidence.3" The rest of this Article is devoted to
an important question too seldom asked: Does the expression "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" accomplish that goal?
B. Approaches to Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases
Courts tell jurors of the government's burden in three different ways.
Some courts attempt to define what constitutes a doubt that is reasonable.
This is the most common approach, and is a mistake for many reasons dis-
cussed later in this Article. Others use the reasonable doubt standard
without defining it. This, I believe, is also a mistake. A third group
attempts to define the government's burden of proof affirmatively. It is
this approach that I espouse here.
1. Explaining What a Doubt Is.-The most typical approach to
instructing juries of the government's burden is to tell them that the
government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and then to tell
the jurors what it means to have a reasonable doubt. This approach is also
31. Despite this sentiment, some people are convicted of crimes that they did not commit. Press
accounts of wrongful convictions are not uncommon. See Pam Belluck, Convict Freed After 16 Years
on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File
(noting the release of a man who was sentenced to death for a crime he did not commit); Adam Cohen,
Innocent, After Proven Guilty, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 26 (describing a junior high school science
teacher's wrongful conviction for rape and murder). While there is substantial literature documenting
the conviction of innocent defendants in today's system of justice, including some celebrated cases, I
can find no analysis that quantifies the phenomenon convincingly. See, e.g., EDWARD CONNORS El
AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT
INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY:
WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991). In Convicted But Innocent, people in
the judicial system were asked for their impressions of the extent of the problem, but it is hard to draw
any reliable inferences from the results. See HUFF ET AL., supra, at 61. Somewhat more convincing,
but still attenuated, are inferences that Huff etal. draw from one well-known study. See HUFF ET AL.,
supra, at 60 (speculating, based on Kalven and Zeisel's study, that one percent of all convictions are
actually erroneously decided against innocent defendants). Using real cases, Kalven and Zeisel found
that judges tend to be harder on defendants than are jurors. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 59 (1966) (representing that "jury trials show on balance a net leniency of 16
percent"). By questioning judges at the conclusion of jury trials, Kalven and Zeisel found that in
16.9% of the cases the judge would have convicted when a jury acquitted, but in only 2.2% of the
cases would the judge have acquitted when the jury convicted. Thus, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that
the judge and jury disagreed 19.1% of the time and agreed 75.4% of the time. In the remaining 5.5%
of cases there was a hung jury. See id. at 56 (providing additional interpretation of these statistics).
Under almost any set of assumptions about who is right in the disputed cases, judge or jury, the rate
of false acquittals is greater than the rate of false convictions, but not by a margin even approaching
Blackstone's 10 to 1 ideal. See HUFF Er AL., supra, at 59-61. In a society that prosecutes such huge
numbers of individuals, even a small rate of error must be taken seriously, since it will cause the false
conviction of substantial numbers of people.
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prevalent in the Canadian courts.12  In a notorious example, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled in 1947 that the following definition of
"reasonable doubt" in a criminal jury instruction violated a defendant's
right to due process:
It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias
or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a
weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the
performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another
human being of the commission of a serious crime.'
This instruction is embarrassing. Presumably, no judge would say such a
thing today. But the fear that drove the trial judge to issue the
instruction-the fear that proof beyond a reasonable doubt offers too much
protection to the guilty-is very much alive in modem courts' subtler but
equally effective approaches to minimizing the government's burden of
proof in criminal cases.
Some courts remind jurors that for a doubt to be reasonable, it must
be "an actual and substantial doubt, and not a mere possible doubt."'
Other courts try to rein in the jurors' imaginations: "A reasonable doubt
is a doubt which is something more than a guess or surmise. It is not a
conjecture or a fanciful doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which
is raised by someone simply for the sake of raising doubts."' Courts that
issue instructions like these have learned to stay away from jellyfish
metaphors, but are still trying to dissuade jurors from acquitting the guilty
based on far-fetched alternative explanations of the evidence.3
32. See Brydon v. The Queen, [1995] 129 D.L.R. 4th 1 (Can.) (evaluating the trial judge's
explanation of the meaning of reasonable doubt and ordering a new trial based on his suggestion that
the jury must grant the accused the benefit of a "unanimous" doubt).
33. People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433,439 (N.Y. 1947) (noting that such a definition "was not
conducive to a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence").
34. Exparte Adkins, 600 So. 2d 1067, 1070 (Ala. 1992); see also Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d
1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt as doubt that is
.actual and substantial" rather than doubt based on "mere possibility or speculation"); Truesdale v.
Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 757 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The term reasonable doubt as used in these
instructions is defined as a substantial doubt or a well-founded doubt arising out of the evidence or the
lack of evidence.").
35. State v. Taylor, 687 A.2d 489, 501 n.12 (Conn. 1996); see also Truesdale, 142 F.3d at 757
n.5 ("A reasonable doubt is not a weak doubt or a slight doubt, nor is a reasonable doubt a whimsical,
fanciful or imaginary doubt, for a person may of course have these kinds of doubts about any
proposition."); United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) ("It is not a mere possible or
imaginary doubt, because as you well know, everything relating to human affairs, and depending on
oral testimony, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.").
36. That is not to say that courts cannot go too far with these instructions. In Cage v. Louisiana,
the Supreme Court held that an instruction telling jurors that "[ilt must be such a doubt as would give
rise to a grave uncertainty" did not pass constitutional muster. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40-41
(1990). The Court also criticized the use of the expression "substantial doubt" elsewhere in the
instruction. See id. at 41.
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In contrast, some courts attempt to define reasonable doubt by likening
it to doubts encountered in real life experience. The most popular of these
instructions tells jurors that a reasonable doubt is "a kind of doubt that
would cause a reasonable and sensible person to hesitate before acting upon
a matter of importance in his or her own affairs. ,37 A variant says that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt "is such proof as ordinary prudent men
and women would act upon in their most important affairs. 38
Many instructions give mixed messages:
A reasonable doubt is not a possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary
or forced doubt. Such a doubt must not influence you to return a
verdict of not guilty if you have an abiding conviction of guilt. On
the other hand, if, after carefully considering, comparing and
weighing all the evidence, there is not an abiding conviction of guilt,
or, if, having a conviction, it is one which is not stable but one
which wavers and vacillates, then the charge is not proved beyond
every reasonable doubt and you must find the defendant not guilty
because the doubt is reasonable.3 9
This sampling does not cover the entire range of "reasonable doubt"
instructions.' ° There are a host of these definitions, some of which
contain a grab bag of warnings about which doubts are not reasonable.4 1
37. Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d 190, 208 (Pa. 1997); see also United States v. Williams,
20 F.3d 125, 129 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (approving an instruction that contains similar language along
with some language from the Federal Judicial Center model instruction).
38. State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn. 1998). This language tracks the Minnesota
Jury Instruction Guide. See MINNESOTA DISTRICT JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES, 10 MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CRIMINALNo. 3.03 (3d ed. 1990).
Some courts give jurors both versions. See Isaac, 134 F.3d at 199. The Third Circuit reviewed the
following instruction in Isaac:
A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt, based upon reason and common sense-the kind of
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing
to rely and act upon it, unhesitatingly, in the most important of your own affairs.
Id. at 202.
39. Woods v. State, 596 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1992). This tracks the language of the Florida
Standard Jury Instructions. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 2.03
(1981) (amended 1998).
40. I will not present an encyclopedia of reasonable doubt instructions, but for some examples,
see Chambers v. State, 944 P.2d 805, 810 (Nev. 1997) ("such doubt as would govern or control a
person in the more weighty affairs of life"); State v. Darby, 477 S.E.2d 710, 710 (S.C. 1996) ("the
kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act"); COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 3.11 (1996) ("proof of such a convincing character
that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act") and U.S. SIXTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES
ASS'N, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 1.03(4) & (5) (1991) ("Possible doubts or doubts
based purely on speculation are not reasonable doubts .... [What is required is] proof which is so
convincing that you would not hesitate to rely and act on it in making the most important decisions in
your own lives.").
41. An especially rich example is the instruction rejected by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1244-45 (N.J. 1996), discussed infra note 162. The confusion
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Even a cursory review shows that the main concern of many of these
instructions is that jurors not get carried away with their imaginations.
Speculation is not permitted-doubts must have an articulable reason. In
Part IV of this Article, I will explain why even much tamer versions of this
approach will often lead to conviction when the strength of the
government's evidence is questionable.
2. Leaving Reasonable Doubt Undefined.-Some courts inform the
jury that the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
but offer no explanation of that term on the theory that any possible
definition would only make the instructions more complicated and
confusing. The Seventh Circuit takes this approach,4' as does the Fourth
Circuit.43 English courts not embracing the "satisfied that you are sure"
standard also take this position.4  The Seventh Circuit justifies its
approach by accepting the following propositions:
[T]hat definition is impossible, that the phrase is self-defining, that
there is no equivalent phrase more easily understood, that every
attempt to explain renders an explanation of the explanation
necessary, that the better practice is not to attempt the definition, and
that any effort at further elucidation tends to misleading
refinements.4 5
associated with these "definitions" has not gone unnoticed. See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL
LANGUAGE 194-96 (1999) (describing both the difficulty that California jurors face in comprehending
that state's antiquated definition of "reasonable doubt" and the risk of reversal that judges who try to
explain the term face); Patricia M. Wald, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Norm Gives Way to the
Numbers, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 111-12 (noting a Supreme Court decision rejecting a state court
definition of reasonable doubt as "'grave uncertainty,' 'actual substantive doubt,' or 'moral certainty'"
as too restrictive (citing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990))).
42. See United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) ("We have reiterated time
and again our admonition that district courts should not attempt to define reasonable doubt."); United
States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (asserting that further definition of "reasonable
doubt" risks the defendant's constitutional rights and offers no appreciable benefit); United States v.
Marquart, 786 F.2d 771,784 (7th Cir. 1986) ("We advise against defining 'reasonable doubt' because
often the definition engenders more confusion than does the term itself."); United States v. Shaffner,
524 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1975) ("It is our opinion that any use of an instruction defining
reasonable doubt presents a situation equivalent to playing with fire. The problem is that such an
instruction is generally employed to favor one side."); United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 439-42
(7th Cir. 1974) (observing that attempts to clarify such common words generally result in further
confusion).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) ("This circuit has
repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to
impermissibly lessen the burden of proof.").
44. In a celebrated case, the English Court of Appeal has recently endorsed both approaches as
acceptable. See R. v. Bentley, [1999] Crim. L. Rev. 330 (finding reversible error in ajury instruction
because it failed to set forth either the "reasonable doubt" standard or the "satisfied that you are sure"
standard by which the jury was to have determined guilt).
45. Lawson, 507 F.2d at 443.
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Judge Posner states the problem in more practical terms:
Undefined and unelaborated, the expression "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" requires, and is (I believe) understood to require,
that the jury be certain of the defendants' guilt, with this proviso:
complete certainty-the certainty of such propositions as that cats do
not grow on trees and that I have never set foot on Mars-is never
attainable with respect to the question whether a criminal defendant
is guilty of the crime for which he is being tried, and the jury should
set aside doubts that it would be unreasonable to entertain given the
practical limitations on attaining certainty in the trial setting....
The principal significance of the requirement of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt comes in cases where, because the screening has
been careless or the prosecutor is improperly motivated, an innocent
person has been indicted (the grand jury is no real screen).
Unfortunately there are such cases-and we don't want a quarter of
them to end in conviction. 46
Posner's views reflect a continued belief in the venerable values discussed
earlier in this Article. There is good reason to believe, however, that use
of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard without definition does not
effectively prevent convictions when the government's case is weak.47
3. Focusing on the Strength of the Government's Case.-The principal
argument of this Article is that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard misfocuses the jury's attention on whether the defense has proffered
reasonable alternative explanations to the prosecution's case, a burden that
a defendant should not be required to meet. But not all explanations of the
government's burden of proof exhibit this problem. The Federal Judicial
Center ("FJC"), in its pattern instruction, tells jurors that they must be
"firmly convinced" of the defendant's guilt before they may convict.
While the instruction also uses the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt," it is almost entirely oriented toward explaining to the jury how
strongly the government must prove its case.4' This kind of approach has
46. Hall, 854 F.2d at 1044 (Posner, J., concurring). Posner's reference to "a quarter of them"
is an allusion to probabilistic thresholds for conviction associated with reasonable doubt. Quantification
of reasonable doubt is discussed more fully infra Part I.
47. See infra Parts III, IV.
48. The Federal Judicial Center instruction reads:
As I have said many times, the government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where
you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not
true. In criminal cases, the government's proof must be more powerful than that. It must
be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
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been accepted in a few states,49 and by some federal circuits." Justice
Ginsburg has specifically endorsed it in her concurring opinion in Victor
v. Nebraska,5' as has Judge Newman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a much-cited law review article. 2
An instruction that both maintains "proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"
and directs the jury to focus on the strength of the government's case was
adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Medina.3  The
court adopted a modified version of the FJC instruction:
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors
in civil cases, where you were told that it is necessary to prove only
that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the
government's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in
your minds about the guilt of the defendant after you have given full
and impartial consideration to all of the evidence. A reasonable
doubt may arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence.
It is a doubt that a reasonable person hearing the same evidence
would have.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. In this world,
we know very few things with absolute certainty. In criminal cases
certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the
other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him
the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 4, No. 21.
49. See, e.g., State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (Ariz. 1995) (requiring that Arizona trial courts
adopt the FJC "firmly convinced" standard in all criminal cases); Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893,
902 (Ind. 1996) (endorsing the FJC "firmly convinced" instruction and recommending Indiana courts
to use the instruction without embellishment); Joyner-Pitts v. State, 647 A.2d 116, 122-23 (Md. 1994)
(holding that the trial court's instructions were invalid because they failed to communicate clearly that
the jury's decision must be made "without reservation").
50. See, e.g., COMMIrrEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, NINTH
CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 3.3 (1997) (defining proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as "proof that leaves you firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty"); United States
v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 128-32 (5th Cir. 1994) (approving of the district court's use of the "firmly
convinced" standard).
51. 511 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1994).
52. See Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt, " 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (1993).
Similarly, Justice Fortunato of Rhode Island recommends an instruction that tells jurors only to convict
when "you are convinced in your mind that it is just about certain-or nearly certain-that the
defendant committed the crime." Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Instructing on Reasonable Doubt After
Victorv. Nebraska:A Trial Judge's Certain Thoughts on Certainty, 41 VILL. L. REV. 365,427 (1996).
53. 685 A.2d 1242 (N.J. 1996).
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the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.
If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly
convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must
find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you are not firmly convinced
of defendant's guilt, you must give defendant the benefit of the doubt
and find him not guilty.54
The instruction reminds jurors that not every doubt is a reasonable one.
But its main focus is to tell the jurors that the real issue is whether the
government has made a strong, convincing case. It is marginally superior
to the FJC's instruction, which ends by indicating that there should be an
acquittal "if there is a real possibility that [the defendant] is not guilty."55
This last line in the FJC instruction tends to shift the burden of proof, as
acknowledged by the Second Circuit.5 ' The New Jersey version corrects
this problem.'
The FJC approach is by no means limited to American jurisdictions.
Some English courts gave up on the reasonable doubt standard decades
ago, and now instruct jurors that they should convict only if they are
satisfied that they are sure.58  Article 353 of the French Code of Criminal
Procedure requires that written instructions be posted in the jury room,
telling jurors that the only standard is that they be "thoroughly convinced"
of the defendant's guilt. 9  For reasons discussed in Part IV of this
54. Id. at 1251-52.
55. See supra note 48.
56. See United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1986) ("As for the district court's
use of the 'real possibility' language . . . we suggest caution . .. as it may provide a basis for
confusion and may be misinterpreted by jurors as unwarrantedly shifting the burden of proof to the
defense."). See infra Part III for a discussion of how reasonable doubt instructions tend to shift the
burden of proof. See also Scott v. Class, 532 N.W.2d 399, 405 (S.D. 1995) (holding that the "real
possibility" language does not render the FJC instruction unconstitutional). My point is not whether
the FJC instruction falls within a range of constitutionally acceptable jury instructions, which it clearly
does. Rather, the point is that the problem can be easily corrected, as the New Jersey court has done.
57. In contrast to New Jersey, some courts begin with the FJC instruction and then add to it other
language that reverts to the approach of defining which doubts are acceptable. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, for example, after using most of the FJC instruction, goes on to tell the
jury: "Reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person, after careful and
thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the graver or more important matters in life. However, it is
not an imaginary doubt, nor a doubt based on speculation or guesswork; it is a doubt based upon
reason." Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
58. See Walters v. Queen [1969] 2 App. Cas. 26, 30 (P.C. 1969) (appeal taken from Jam.)
(holding that instructions should convey to the jury an understanding that, to find against the defendant,
the jury must be suxe of his guilt).
59. See THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art.353, at 172 (Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans., rev. ed. 1988).
Before the assize court retires, the president shall read the following instruction, which,
in addition, shall be posted in large letters in the most prominent place in the conference
room: "The law does not ask an accounting from judges of the grounds by which they
became convinced; it does not prescribe for them rules on which they must make the
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Article, these approaches, which focus on what the government must
establish, are less likely to lead to convictions when the government's case
is weak.
III. Empirical Research: The Problems with Reasonable Doubt Instructions
Empirical evidence supports my suggestion that the expression "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" is likely to lead to conviction in some cases in
which the government's evidence is unimpressive. This part of the Article
will first examine a number of studies using both real and mock jurors
reported over the past two decades. The experimental literature contains
two types of studies: some compare conviction rates for different jury
instructions, while others place probability values on different standards of
proof. Both types of study strongly suggest that jurors are more likely to
convict defendants on highly equivocal evidence when the instruction either
attempts to explain which doubts are reasonable, or leaves reasonable doubt
undefined. This part will then discuss criminal justice data from New
Jersey, noting suggestive statistical changes following the 1996 Medina
decision in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered a radical
change in burden of proof instructions.
A. Experimental Studies Using Real and Mock Jurors
1. The Effects of Different Instructions.-Many empirical studies
support the claim that standard reasonable doubt instructions tend to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant. A number of these further support
the position that the FJC's firmly convinced instruction is less likely than
standard reasonable doubt instructions to lead to conviction when the
government's case is weak. One recent study questioned actual jurors in
Wyoming after their participation in trials.' ° Wyoming judges use stan-
dard reasonable doubt instructions that do not define that term.6' One of
the questions asked jurors whether they agreed with the statement that once
the state has come forward with evidence of a defendant's guilt, it becomes
fullness and sufficiency of a proof particularly depend; it requires of them that they ask
themselves, in silence and reflection to seek out, in the sincerity of the conscience, what
impression the evidence reported against the accused and the ground of his defense have
made on their reason. The law asks them only the single question, which encompasses
the full measure of their duties: "Are you thoroughly convinced?"
60. See Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998).
61. The Wyoming revised criminal pattern jury instruction reads: "In order to convict the
defendant of the crime charged, every material and necessary element to constitute such crime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and if the jury has a reasonable doubt on any necessary element, it
is your duty to give the benefit of such doubt to the defendant and acquit him." Id. at 96 n.73 (quoting
WYOMING PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 1.03).
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the defendant's responsibility to persuade the jury of his innocence.6' Of
the jurors participating in the study, 30.5 % said they were either very sure
or pretty sure that this statement was true.6" That is, when asked, almost
one-third of the jurors consciously believed that the reasonable doubt
standard does cause a shift in the burden of proof from the government to
the defendant, despite instructions by the court explaining the presumption
of innocence. 4
In another study, Irwin Horowitz, a psychology professor, and Laird
C. Kirkpatrick, a law professor, compared juror reactions to various
burden of proof instructions, including the FJC's firmly convinced
instruction. Jury-eligible adults recruited from the community watched a
mock murder trial presented on tape and slides.6' Half of the subjects
were presented with a "weak" case, in which the evidence was prescreened
to be at the midpoint on a certainty of guilt scale. The other half were
presented with a "strong" version, in which the evidence was predeter-
mined to favor the prosecution by an 85-15 margin.' After hearing one
of the stories, the jurors were divided into six-juror panels for
62. See id. at 141. The question read:
According to the instructions the judge gave you, is the following statement true or false:
In a criminal trial, the state is responsible for producing evidence for the jury that tends
to show that the defendant may have committed the crime-once the state has made this
showing, it is the defendant's responsibility to produce witnesses or other evidence to
persuade the jury that the defendant did not commit the crime.
Id. Jurors could respond with, "I'm VERY SURE that this statement is TRUE"; "I'm PRET=Y SURE
that this statement is TRUE"; "I DON'T KNOW"; "I'm PRET=Y SURE that this statement is
FALSE"; or "I'm VERY SURE that this statement is FALSE." Id.
63. See id. at 97.
64. For another study using actual jurors, see Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do
Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror
Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401 (1990). The instructions that these participants
heard defined reasonable doubt as "not merely an imaginary doubt or a flimsy, fanciful doubt or a
doubt based upon the mere possibility of the innocence of the defendant or a doubt based upon
sympathy ...." Id. at 436. But the instruction ends with: " T]here must be such evidence that causes
you to have a firm conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge here made against the
defendant." Id. The instruction is a confusing grab-bag, and the results of the study reflect this. Of
the instructed jurors, 25.2% wrongly thought that they should acquit if they could see "any possibility,
no matter how slight, that the defendant is innocent." Id. at 414. But 31.8 % of the instructed jurors
thought that "[a] reasonable doubt must be based only on the evidence that was presented in the
courtroom, not on any conclusion that you draw from the evidence." Id. One cannot tell the extent
to which the same jurors believed both of these erroneous propositions. The strongest conclusion one
can draw is that the instructions left jurors confused.
65. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition: The
Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 655, 659-61 (1996). This work is further presented in Irwin A. Horowitz,
Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Commonsense Justice and Standard of Proof, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 285 (1997). The methodology was developed in part in Irwin A. Horowitz & David G. Seguin,
The Effects of Bifurcation and Death Qualification on Assignment of Penalty in Capital Crimes, 16 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (1986).
66. Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, supra note 65, at 661.
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deliberation.67 At that point the forty jury panels were divided into five
separate groups of eight juries.68 Each eight-jury group heard one of the
following five reasonable doubt instructions: (1) moral certainty; (2) does
not cause you to waver and vacillate;69 (3) real doubt; (4) reasonable
doubt undefined; and (5) firmly convinced, the Federal Judicial Center's
instruction.7'
Each of the three types of instruction discussed in Part II of this
Article is represented in the Horowitz and Kirkpatrick study. The first
three attempt to define reasonable doubt, the fourth leaves reasonable doubt
undefined and the fifth is the Federal Judicial Center's instruction. The
results are presented below in Table 1:
TABLE 1
Guilty Verdicts as a Function of Evidentiary Strength
and Reasonable Doubt Instructions (From Horowitz and Kirkpatrick)7





Moral Waiver or Real Undefined Firmly
Certainty Vacillate Doubt Convinced
Guilty 4 4 3 4 0
Not 4 3 3 2 8
Guilty I I I I I
Hung 0 1 2 2 0
Jury I I I 1 _1
67. See id. at 659.
68. See id. at 664.
69. Horowitz & Kirkpatrick call this instruction, "WV," since it says that "[p]roof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof that means that you do not waver or vacillate concerning the defendant's
guilt." Id. at 660. But the instruction then goes on at length explaining that not all doubt is reasonable
doubt and ends by saying: "If. . . you do not waver or vacillate that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged, you must find him guilty. If... you think there is a real possibility that he is not
guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him 'not guilty.'" Id. at 660. This
instruction obviously gives the jury mixed and confusing messages.
70. Id. at 660-61.
71. Id. at 663 tbl.1. The data are from Table I of their Article, but has been reorganized here




Moral Waiver or Real Undefined Firmly
Certainty Vacillate Doubt Convinced
Guilty 8 5 6 5 6
Not 0 1 1 1 2
Guilty
Hung 0 2 1 2 0
Jury
For the strong case, the category of instruction did not matter significantly.
Jurors convicted most of the time across the board, the actual rate of
conviction varying slightly as a function of the number of hung juries for
each condition. But for the weak case, the only instruction for which there
were no convictions was the Federal Judicial Center's. For all others,
there were convictions about half the time. This is startling-it means that
the prosecutor had a fifty percent chance of getting a conviction even when
a case was designed to be as neutral as possible with respect to a
defendant's guilt. Even if one is skeptical about the actual percentages, the
comparisons are striking. Jurors perform differently in response to the
firnly convinced standard, which keeps the focus on the government's
burden of proof.
A study by Robert J. MacCoun and Norbert L. Kerr provides further
support for this position.' Using students as subjects, they set out to
investigate whether deliberation makes jurors more lenient. 3  Harry
Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel had found in their 1966 book that juries
acquitted some defendants that judges would have convicted had there been
a bench trial.74 MacCoun and Kerr attempted to investigate the source of
this phenomenon. They presented subjects with an audiotape of an auto
theft trial along with a transcript and various photographs and exhibits.75
The structure of the study was to have subjects put into four-person juries
in which half of the jurors believed the defendant to be guilty prior to
deliberation, and the other half believed him to be innocent prior to
72. Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation:
Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 21 (1988).
73. See id. at 21-22.
74. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 55-59.
75. See MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 72, at 27.
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deliberation.76 If significantly more of the juries acquitted, then the study
would support the leniency effect.
MacCoun and Kerr quickly encountered a design difficulty. If the
case was too strong, it was difficult to find enough jurors who initially
believed that the defendant was innocent. They dealt with this problem as
follows: "In order to facilitate the formation of 2:2 mock juries, the trial
transcript was modified until pretesting indicated that it was as equivocal
as possible regarding the guilt of the defendant. The overall 55% convic-
tion rate in the present study indicates that this effort was successful. "I
In other words, MacCoun and Kerr intentionally used a weak case, a tactic
frequently employed in mock jury experiments to avoid "swamp[ing] the
(usually more subtle) variables that are the focus of the study."'8 The
reasonable doubt instruction contained the statement that "[a] reasonable
doubt about the defendant's guilt must be a fair one, one based on reason,
and one for which reasons can be given."" 9 This instruction attempts to
define which doubts are reasonable. Unlike the FJC instruction, it focuses
the jury on the defendant's evidence, not on the government's burden.
Half of MacCoun and Kerr's mock juries were given a preponderance
of the evidence instruction and half a reasonable doubt instruction. The
results are presented below in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Group Outcomes for Each Standard of Proof





Not Guilty 28 21
Hung Jury 9 6
The twenty-six percent conviction rate (10 of 38 juries reaching a verdict)
is consistent with the proposition that such instructions lead to unacceptably
76. See id. at 28.
77. Id. at 27.
78. Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Erperiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 1, 19 (1997).
79. MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 72, at 28.
80. See id. at 29 tbl.6.
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high rates of conviction in weak cases. In contrast, these results support
a "leniency hypothesis" only in the most ironic sense: When a case is so
weak that important values underlying our legal system tell us there should
be no conviction, the acquittal rate is about three quarters.8 '
Two other studies suggest that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard leads to more convictions in weak cases than a standard of proof
focused on what the government must establish. In a study conducted at
the London School of Economics, mock jurors selected from the commu-
nity were asked to deliberate after hearing simulated trials in a rape case
with two defendants and a theft case.' The trials were "selected for their
brevity and uncertainty," '3 meaning that they were not strong cases.
Some jurors received definitional "reasonable doubt" instructions of the
sort criticized earlier in this Article. 4 Others were told not to convict
unless "you ... feel sure and certain on the evidence you have heard that
the accused is guilty. "I A third group was given a preponderance of the
evidence instruction.
The results for the rape case are just as we should expect. There were
significantly fewer convictions for each of the two defendants from juries
that heard the "sure and certain" instruction (55 % and 18 %, respectively,
for the two defendants) than from juries who heard the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" instruction (66% and 32%, respectively, for the two
defendants),. 6 Again, the London School of Economics experiment sup-
ports the notion that instructions that focus on the government's proof lead
to fewer convictions in weak cases than instructions that focus on how
strongly the defendant has raised doubt.
81. MacCoun & Kerr's subjects were students, who tend to be more lenient than members ofjury
pools. See infra note 110. This may explain, at least in part, the fact that their experiment shows
lower conviction rates than do Horowitz & Kirkpatrick's experiments. See supra note 71 and the
accompanying table. I do not claim that MacCoun & Kerr's study as reinterpreted here disconfirms
Kalven & Zeisel's observation that jurors tend to be more lenient than judges. See KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 31, at 68. Nothing here or in MacCoun and Kerr's experiments argues against that
observation.
82. See L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 210-11.
83. Id. at 210.
84. The instruction for the rape cases said in part: "you should be sure beyond reasonable doubt
and by reasonable doubt I mean not a fanciful doubt that you might use to avoid an unpleasant decision,
but a doubt for which reasons can be given." Id. at 213.
85. Id. This instruction was used as an intermediate burden of proof, similar to the "clear and
convincing" standard used in the United States. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1978)
(observing that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof is generally used in civil cases where the
-interests at stake are.. . deemed to be more substantial than the mere loss of money"); see also
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 340, 441-45 (4th ed. 1992) (listing the kinds of cases in which the "clear
and convincing" standard is applied).
86. See L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 82, at 216-17.
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Finally, in another study by Norbert Kerr and his colleagues,' 645
subjects (again psychology students) were shown a fifty minute simulation
of a rape trial which had produced "strong, predeliberation
disagreement."' Subjects were subsequently divided into six-person
juries. One-third of the juries received a "lax" reasonable doubt
instruction, which included the requirement that for a doubt to be
reasonable, it must be possible to state a reason for it. 9 The "stringent"
reasonable doubt instruction, also given to one-third of the juries, told the
jurors that they must acquit if they can come up with an alternative model
of the facts.' The remaining jurors received no definition at all.
The results are dramatic. While only 2 of 19 juries hearing the strin-
gent condition (alternative model of the facts) voted unanimously for
conviction (10.5%), 8 of 19 juries hearing the lax condition (possible to
state a reason for, doubt) voted unanimously to convict (42.1%).9t Of
those juries that received no definition, 3 of 11 (27.3%) voted for
conviction.'
The conditions in Kerr et al.'s study correspond to the three
approaches discussed in Part II of this Article, although their lax instruction
is more lax than those used in most jurisdictions today, and their stringent
instruction is more stringent than the Federal Judicial Center's.
Nonetheless, the results are consistent with the results of all the other
studies: Juries convict less often when they are asked to focus on how well
the government has proven its case instead of how well the defense has
established doubt.
2. Probability Studies.-A second type of experimental data supports
the view that instructions that focus on doubt instead of the government's
burden increase conviction rates. These studies ask jurors how certain they
think they should be on a numerical scale before they convict. If we
accept Blackstone's 10 to 1 error rate in favor of false acquittals,9' then
87. See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition
and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
282 (1976).
88. Id. at 286.
89. The lax instruction read in part: "A reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt must be a
substantial one, a fair one, one based on reason, and one for which reasons can be given. In summary
you need not be absolutely sure that the defendant is guilty to find him guilty." Id.
90. The stringent instruction read in part: "That is, before you can return a verdict of guilty you
must be sure and certain that the defendant is guilty. . . . If you feel that the facts of this case are
compatible with any other theory besides the one in which the defendant is guilty, then you have a
reasonable doubt about his guilt and must find him not guilty." Id.
91. See id. at 287 tbl.1.
92. See id. The experiment contained other conditions that concerned the effects of jury
instructions on juries when unanimous votes are not required. I do not discuss those results here.
93. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 358.
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we might expect reasonable doubt to require about 91 % certainty. Three
published surveys have asked sitting judges how certain they think jurors
should be before convicting beyond a reasonable doubt. One was
conducted by Judge Weinstein with federal judges sitting in the Eastern
District of New York, and is reported in his opinion in United States v.
Fatico.4  Ten judges were polled. Nine gave a numerical probability
associated with reasonable doubt. Of the nine judges, one gave a proba-
bility of 76 %, one gave 80%, four gave 85 %, two gave 90%, and one
gave 95% .9 In other words, the probabilities hovered around 85 % -90 %.
A second study asked federal judges throughout the United States to
quantify the conviction threshold for reasonable doubt. 96 Of the 171
judges who responded, 126 had thresholds that were 90% or higher. 7
Eleven judges had thresholds of 75 % or below, one of whom was satisfied
with a 50% probability.98 The other study was conducted among Illinois
state court judges. 99 On a scale of 1 to 10, the mean level of certainty in
this study was 8.9, with a median of 8.8; 63% of the judges responded
with a level of 9.0 or higher." ° Most (but not all) judges, then, tend to
see the government's burden much the way Blackstone did.
Our courts do not use jury instructions based on percentages of
certainty, and I do not suggest here that they begin doing so.'0'
Nonetheless, studies that present jurors with different burden of proof
instructions and then, prior to deliberation, ask them to quantify the
threshold of certainty needed for a conviction can act as a window into how
different approaches to burden of proof influence jurors' understandings of
their task. Similarly, studies that compare rates of conviction between
94. 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
95. See id. at 410.
96. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens ofProof. A Viewfrom the Bench,
the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & Soc'Y REV. 319 (1971). Judges were asked: "What would the
likelihood or probability have to be that a defendant committed the act for you to decide that he is
guilty?" Id. at 324.
100. See id. at 324. Potential jurors responding to the same question displayed somewhat lower
standards for the government. The median was 8.6, the mean, 7.9; 54% of the jurors responded with
9.0 or higher. See id.
101. For arguments against creating a quantitative approach to burden of proof, see generally
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1329 (1971). In this regard I disagree with Saks, supra note 78, at 31, who suggests that juror
comprehension of burden of proof instructions be improved by providing them with quantified
definitions. To support his claim that these quantified definitions help, Saks relies on Dorothy K.
Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 159, 169 (1985) (finding that "[i]n terms of their intended effects on verdicts, the quantified
definition worked"), which is discussed infra note 111.
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jurors given probability thresholds on the one hand, and jurors given
reasonable doubt instructions on the other, can be instructive. Both kinds
of studies exist, and both suggest that instructions focusing on the
government's burden instead of on definitions of reasonable doubt decrease
the rate of conviction in weak cases.
For example, Horowitz and Kirkpatrick asked their subjects
(prospective jurors), after hearing the trial and the instructions but before
deliberating, to quantify the government's burden of proof required for
conviction. Recall that Horowitz and Kirkpatrick presented both strong
and weak cases to their subjects. Here, I focus only on responses in the
weak cases since those are the cases in which we should not see
convictions. The average response was an astonishingly low 61.122%.1"
When asked again after deliberation, subjects responded similarly, at
61.574%.103 Of all the instructions, only the firmly convinced standard
produced a higher threshold. Pre-deliberation, the average response was
68.87%, and post-deliberation, the average response was 80.75%.1° In
contrast, when the reasonable doubt instruction told jurors that they must
have a "real doubt," the pre- and post-deliberation probability thresholds
were 68.25% and 61.62%, respectively."05 Instructions leaving reaso-
nable doubt undefined produced a pre-deliberation threshold of 52.87%,
and a post-deliberation threshold of 55.00%, °6 well below any level of
certainty that our system claims to tolerate.
Kerr et al. conducted a similar survey. On an eleven-point scale,
subjects were asked for the "probability of guilt necessary for conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt."" °  The lax (reasonable doubt requires a
reason that can be stated) and undefined reasonable doubt instructions both
produced threshold probabilities of 82%."0 The stringent, government-
oriented instruction (jurors must acquit if they can come up with an alter-
native model of the facts) produced a threshold of 87%, significantly
higher."°  One can speculate about why the absolute numbers vary so
much between the two sets of studies. One factor, no doubt, is that Kerr
et al. used student subjects, while Horowitz and Kirkpatrick used prospec-
tive jurors. Students tend to be more lenient than the population as a
whole."' Regardless of the absolute numbers, the relationship between





107. Kerr et al., supra note 87, at 290.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Simon & Mahan, supra note 99, at 324 tbl.4 (finding the mean probability threshold of
students at 8.9, and the mean probability threshold of jurors at 7.9, based on a 10-point scale).
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threshold probability and the type of reasonable doubt instruction remains
constant.
In a set of experiments by Dorothy K. Kagehiro and W. Clark
Stanton, psychology students were presented with a summary of a civil
trial."' At the end of the trial, some were given a reasonable doubt
instruction that defined reasonable doubt in terms of moral certainty, and
others were told that they should render a verdict for the plaintiff only if
they had at least a 91% degree of certainty."' In-the first experiment,
subjects then stated what they thought the verdict should be, without
deliberation. The results were plaintiff's verdicts 43 % of the time with the
reasonable doubt instruction, but only 31 % of the time with the quantified
instruction, a difference of 12%13 A second experiment was conducted
the same way, but using the Federal Judicial Center's firmly convinced
instruction instead of the moral certainty instruction. The rate of plaintiff's
verdicts for those hearing the quantified instruction (requiring 91%
certainty) was 36%, and for those hearing the firmly convinced instruction
the rate was 41%." 4  The difference between the two was largely
eliminated. This adds further support to the notion that the firmly con-
vinced standard comes closest to meeting the stated values underlying the
notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In yet a third experiment, Kagehiro and Stanton gave their subjects a
variety of reasonable doubt instructions.' Among other tasks, subjects
were asked to say how hard it should be on a 1-9 scale to convict under the
standard presented to them.Y6 The quantified reasonable doubt instruc-
tion of 91 % certainty produced a score of 6.1.117 The firmly convinced
instruction produced a score of 6.9.118 The others produced scores
ranging from 3.8 to 5.1,119 reflecting a significantly lower burden on the
government. In these experiments, only the firmly convinced standard
even approaches the assumed burden of proof.
Interestingly, Kagehiro and Stanton also looked at instructions telling
the jury what it means to decide a case based on clear and convincing
evidence. Although this standard is supposed to be an intermediate burden
of proof,12" I would predict that defendant-oriented reasonable doubt
instructions actually place less burden on the government than do clear and
111. See Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 101, at 162.
112. See id. at 163.
113. See id. at 164 tbl.1.
114. See id. at 169 tbl.3.
115. See id. at 170.
116. See id. at 171.
117. See id. at 173 tbl.4.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See supra note 85.
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convincing instructions. The latter focus the jury on the government's
burden, while the former focus the jury on the defendant's ability to come
up with alternative explanations. The Colorado jury instructions tested by
Kagehiro and Stanton have these characteristics. The clear and convincing
instruction focuses on the government's burden,'21 while the reasonable
doubt instruction focuses on the quality of doubts acceptable to avoid
conviction. 1' Subjects hearing these instructions gave the clear and
convincing evidence a 6.3 probability threshold on the 1-9 scale, but gave
the reasonable doubt instruction only a 3.8 probability threshold." The
Federal Judicial Center's firmly convinced instruction, in contrast, was
considered more demanding than the corresponding federal clear and con-
vincing evidence standard (6.9 vs. 5.6).124
B. Real WOrld Data: The New Jersey Experience
As discussed above, in 1996 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
rejected a reasonable doubt instruction that focused on defining which
doubts are reasonable"z and replaced it with a modified version of the
Federal Judicial Center's instruction. 6 The questions asked here are
what changes, if any, have there been in New Jersey's criminal justice
statistics since that time, and whether we can attribute any such changes to
the increase in the government's burden of proof.
Prior to 1996, the conviction rate in New Jersey criminal cases was
about two-thirds. Since the switch, it has remained about the same z -
the small fluctuation that has occurred is not statistically significant."
121. The instruction reads: "[Proof by clear and convincing evidence is] proof which is stronger
than a 'preponderance of the evidence' and which is highly probable and free from serious or
substantial doubt." Id. at 177.
122. The reasonable doubt instruction reads in part: "It is doubt which is not vague, speculative
or imaginary doubt, but such a doubt as would cause reasonable persons to hesitate to act in matters
of importance to themselves." Id.
123. See id. at 173 tbl.4.
124. The federal clear and convincing evidence instruction used in the experiment required "proof
which is 'clear' in the sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding, unambiguous, and
.convincing' in the sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe it." Id.
125. See State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1246-48 (N.J. 1996).
126. See id. at 1251-52.
127. In the year ending June 1996, there were 651 acquittals and 1305 convictions in criminal
trials for a 33.28% acquittal rate. See N.J. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CRIMINAL DIV., 1995-
1996 ANN. REP. [hereinafter 1995-1996 ANN. REP.]. In the year ending June 1997, the rate was
32.71% (616 acquittals and 1267 convictions). See N.J. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CRIMINAL
DIV., 1996-1997 ANN. REP. [hereinafter 1996-1997 ANN. REP.]. In the year ending June 1998, the
rate was 35.18% (635 acquittals and 1170 convictions). See N.J. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
CRIMINAL DIV., 1997-1998 ANN. REP. [hereinafter 1997-1998 ANN. REP.].
128. A chi-square analysis was performed: X = 2.1165, df = 2, p>.25. The chi-square
compares actual frequencies with expected frequencies, given a null hypothesis. Here, the null
hypothesis is that the rate of conviction would remain constant after the Medina decision. The actual
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To see why the rate has remained the same, let us hypothesize that the
typical New Jersey prosecutor is willing to take a case to trial if she
believes that she has a two out of three chance of getting a conviction.
Assuming that this level of risk taking remains constant even after the New
Jersey Supreme Court increased the government's burden of proof, we
would not expect a lower rate of conviction. Rather, all other things being
equal, fewer cases would go to trial, with more dismissals and more guilty
pleas to reduced charges.' 29 Some cases that a prosecutor might have
been willing to take to trial before 1996 have become less attractive after
Medina. This is exactly what the data suggest. Although the total number
of criminal cases increased 5.7% between 1996 and 1998, 7.8% fewer
cases went to trial.13 This decrease is statistically significant.' In
contrast, more cases were terminated after guilty pleas to downgraded
charges. Dismissals remained about constant during these years.
Although there are too many variables to permit strong causative
claims, 1"4 the data certainly do not provide disconfirming evidence-
conviction rates did not vary enough from the expected rates to require that the null hypothesis be
rejected. The chi-square is explained in virtually every text on statistics. See, e.g., JAMES BROOK,
A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 197-208 (1990).
129. For a discussion of the relationship between case selection and win rates in the context of
civil cases, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998).
130. While the number of cases in 1997 increased to 115,877 from 110,051 in 1996, the total
number of trials decreased slightly from 1,956 to 1,883. See 1995-1996 ANN. REP., supra note 127;
1996-1997 ANN. REP., supra note 127. For 1998, the total number of cases increased further to
116,269, and the number of trials had decreased further, to 1805. See 1997-1998 ANN. REP., supra
note 127. Given the 5.7% increase in the number of cases, the null hypothesis would be a
commensurate increase in the number of trials. But the number of trials fell 7.8 % (a decrease of 151
from 1,956 trials).
131. X2=48.4178, df=2,p< .001. The null hypothesis for the analysis is that the number of trials
will vary with the number of cases.
132. In the year ending June 1998, 47,995 cases were terminated after guilty pleas to downgraded
charges. See 1997-1998 ANN. REP., supra note 127. In the year ending June 1997,48,375 cases were
terminated after guilty pleas to downgraded charges. See 1996-1997 ANN. REP., supra note 127. In
the year ending June 1996, 43,570 cases were terminated after guilty pleas to downgraded charges.
See 1995-1996 ANN. REP., supra note 127.
133. Pre-indictment dismissals numbered 15,264 in 1996 (13.87% of the total cases), see 1995-
1996 ANN. REP., supra note 127; 14,989 in 1997 (12.99% of the total cases), see 1996-1997 ANN.
REP., supra note 127; and 14,582 in 1998 (12.54% of the total cases), see 1997-1998 ANN. REP.,
supra note 127. Post-indictment dismissals numbered 6,899 in 1996 (6.27% of the total), see 1995-
,1996 ANN. REP., supra note 127; 6,956 in 1997 (6.0% of the total), see 1996-1997 ANN. REP., supra
note 127; and 6,937 in 1998 (5.99% of the total), see 1997-1998 ANN. REP., supra note 127.
134. For a discussion of some of the dangers of drawing strong conclusions from such data, see
Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and
the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1994). Here, for example, the number of criminal
cases taken to trial had fallen in some years prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court's Medina decision,
demonstrating that there can be many reasons for changes in this statistic. Moreover, we do not know
in any detail whether the range of negotiated pleas has changed, as would be predicted.
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neither conviction rates nor the number of cases going to trial have
increased following the Medina decision.135
C. Summary
Although some of these studies are better designed than others, there
are simply too many data points to ignore. Most problems with the
experiments, such as the sophistication of the trial materials, the population
of subjects, and the fact that subjects knew they were participating in an
experiment, go to the reliability of the absolute scores. Nonetheless,
within each experimental setting, the relationships among the reactions to
various instructions reflect differences in how the subjects understand the
instructions with respect to the experimental task. The studies show the
same relationships among the different instructions regardless of the
task.'36 One study after another, when analyzed in terms of the obser-
vations made earlier in this Article, shows that jurors convict more often
in weak cases when the burden of proof centers around the meaning of
doubt. The studies further show that jurors set unacceptably low convic-
tion thresholds when the instruction focuses on the defendant, and not on
the government. The conclusion is clear: courts should abandon all efforts
to tell jurors which doubts are legitimate and which ones are not. Instead,
they should tell jurors not to convict unless the government has proven its
case to a very high degree of certainty. This is the standard that earlier
135. Criminal justice statistics for the federal courts are more plentiful. See, e.g., DIR. OF THE
ADMIN. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 204 tbl.D-7 (1990). Differences in the demographics among
the districts, combined with the fact that the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court accept a wide
range of reasonable doubt instructions from the trial courts, make it particularly difficult to draw sound
conclusions from the federal data. Moreover, these results are analogous to other empirical evidence
of what happens when the burden on the government is increased in the criminal process. For
example, studies suggest that the number of criminal suspects who confess has not changed as a result
of the Supreme Court's 1966 Miranda decision. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(requiring police officers to warn suspects about their right to remain silent). For a discussion of these
studies, see George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better)
Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996).
In an interesting article, George Thomas suggests that while the rate of confession may not have
changed, police attitude and conduct have. See Thomas, supra, at 832-33 (citing a study concluding
that when Miranda warnings are given, police tend to be "more serious about the interrogation"). If
so, then the New Jersey experience discussed in this section may be a special case of a larger
phenomenon by which government officials adjust their conduct in reaction to new assessments of risk.
Without question, more work in this area is called for, and is occurring. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell
& Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda,
43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996) (analyzing the results of a study done in Utah regarding police
questioning and confessions).
136. "Every type of study, and every individual study, inevitably will be imperfect. The basic
solutions to those imperfections are replication and triangulation." Saks, supra note 78, at 5.
"Triangulation" occurs "[i]f studies employing different methodologies produce similar results, [and
therefore] we gain increasing confidence in the conclusions." Id. (footnote omitted). In the various
experiments I have examined we have both replication and triangulation.
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generations in our history intended, and this is the standard to which
criminal defendants are entitled.
IV. Why We Should Expect the Reasonable Doubt Standard to Lead to
Convictions in Weak Cases: A Linguistic Analysis
Recent advances in linguistics, philosophy of language, and cognitive
psychology explain the empirical results presented above. For several
reasons, the expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is not likely to
accomplish the policy goal articulated in Part II that conviction occur only
when the jury has the "highest degree of certitude" 37 about the
defendant's guilt.
A. Doubting and the Creation of Mental Models
The verb "to doubt" is what linguists and philosophers call a verb of
propositional attitude. It describes the speaker's attitude toward a
proposition. Loosely, it means something like, "to think a proposition is
not true," as in: "Do you think it will rain tomorrow?" "I doubt it."
1 38
Justice Scalia's recent characterization of the cognate noun, "an uncertain,
tentative, or provisional disbelief,"1 39 gleaned from various dictionaries,
describes this sense of the concept well." 0 The word is a label for a
cognitive process that occurs innately. That is, if our language had no
verb, "to doubt," we would know how to doubt anyway, and would just
have to use different language to describe the mental process. 141
Philosophers of language and some linguists have, over the past
several decades, explained verbs of propositional attitude through "possible
137. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 11 (1994).
138. The verb "doubt" has 3 senses in WordNet:
1. doubt-(consider unlikely or have doubts about)
2. suspect, distrust, doubt-(suspect to be false; 'I distrust that man')
3. doubt-(lack confidence in; 'I doubt these reports').
Search of WordNet 1.6, Cognitive Science Laboratory of Princeton University (visited Sept. 9, 1999)
<http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-binlwebwnl?stage= 1&word=doubt>.
139. Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S.Ct. 818, 823 (1998). That case
concerned the interpretation of the phrase, "good faith reasonable doubt." See id. at 820. The NLRB
requires that an employer have a good faith reasonable doubt that a union representing its workers
continues to enjoy majority support before it is permitted to conduct an election to determine whether
that support continues to exist. See id. The applicability of the reasonable doubt standard in labor law
is outside the scope of this Article. However, the analysis presented here suggests that the standard
is inappropriate. It would make more sense for the NLRB to state the standard in terms of a level of
certainty rather than in terms of doubt. My agreement with Justice Scalia's characterization of "doubt"
does not extend to agreement with his interpretation of the standard's applicability in NLRB
proceedings.
140. "Doubt" as a noun is actually ambiguous. It also is used to refer to the things and events
that lead one to have doubt. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
141. For a recent discussion of why such concepts should be considered innate regardless of their
linguistic manifestation, see JERRY A. FODOR, CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG
120-45 (1998).
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world" semantics. 42 According to this perspective, the meaning of a
proposition is the set of conditions in which it is true. Thus, "it is raining"
is true if it is raining, and the meaning of that sentence, therefore, is a
description of the state of affairs in the world when it is raining. But what
are the truth conditions for counterfactual statements such as "If it weren't
raining, then I would be outside"? Such sentences are true if I am outside
in some possible world that is just like the real world except for the fact
that it is not raining in this possible world. Verbs of propositional attitude,
like know, believe, doubt, think, and so on, can be similarly described. A
sentence "B doubts p" is true if B thinks that p is not true in the real
world, even though it might be true in possible worlds, which are just like
the real world, except for p. When I doubt that it is raining, I usually have
in mind that it might be raining, but I think it really isn't raining.
In the past two decades, linguists and psychologists have constructed
theories that capture and claim psychological reality to the insights of the
philosophical literature. Philip Johnson-Laird's "mental models," 43 Ray
Jackendoff's "conceptual structure,""' Gilles Fouconnier's "mental
space," 45 and George Lakoffs "idealized cognitive models," " all
attempt to capture the notion that in thinking and understanding language
we construct models into which we fit new information and draw
inferences. If I doubt it is raining, I have created a model of the world in
which it is raining, but I think that this model does not fit the reality of the
world at the time. 1
Seen this way, the burden of proof in criminal cases should require the
government to do two things. First, the government must create a model
of the events in question that strongly supports its claim of guilt. The
literature on jury behavior speaks of jurors being presented with conflicting
stories, which is consistent with the mental model approach."¢ Second,
the government must prove its case to the point that the jurors cannot
reasonably create alternative mental models of the evidence inconsistent
with the government's case. In other words, the juror has to be able to say
to herself, "the government's proof is so strong that I can't reasonably
142. For a brief discussion of this perspective, see PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS
56-61 (1983). For a more technical discussion, see SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980);
DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACrUALS 84-91 (1973). For a readable explanation of model-theoretic
semantics, see EMMON BACH, INFORMAL LECTURES ON FORMAL SEMANTICS (1989).
143. See JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 142, at 53.
144. See RAY S. JACKENDOFF, SEMANTICS AND COGNITION 17 (1983).
145. See GILLES FAUCONNIER, MENTAL SPACES 16 (1994).
146. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1986).
147. For an interesting article that discusses judicial reasoning in terms of the formation of mental
models, see Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of JudicialDecision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 77-
85 (1998).
148. See REID HASrIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 15-36 (1983).
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imagine that he didn't do it." Some older reasonable doubt instructions,
no longer in use, put the burden of proof in just those terms. 149
Of course, these two tasks are not unrelated. The stronger the
government's case, the harder it is to come up with reasonable alternative
accounts. However, they are not exactly the same thing. It is entirely
possible for the government to put on a weak case for which an innocent
defendant is unable to produce an alternative story that is not entirely
speculative. One problem with "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is that
it focuses too much on the second of these tasks, at the expense of the first.
The phrase encourages jurors to take the government's case as a given and
then challenges them to find alternatives. None of this is a problem when
the government's proof is strong and convincing, but when the
government's case is weak, this focus asks too little of the government and
does not support the goals the reasonable doubt standard is intended to
promote.150
Once the jury has found the facts by creating whatever models it does,
it must decide how to match the model it has accepted with the elements
of the crime of which the defendant is accused. In criminal cases, jurors
are not limited to fact-finding. They also determine whether the facts that
they find constitute a crime as the judge defines it.' The legal cate-
gories are themselves mental models, and the jurors must form "a
classification in which the best match between the story features and verdict
category features is determined." 5" For reasons I discuss below, this
task, too, is problematic. The tendency is to find the closest match, rather
than the match in which the jurors are certain that the government has
proven every element of the crime. 53
B. Conceptual Problems with the Reasonable Doubt Standard
1. The Government's Burden Remains Unquantified.-One problem
with the expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is that it fails to
address how much proof is needed before we start thinking about doubts.
To see the problem as a special case of a more general cognitive
149. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 439 (1887) (approving an instruction to the jury "'[t]hat
if you can reconcile the evidence before you upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the
defendant's innocence, you should do so, and in that case find him not guilty.'").
150. The goals of the standard are articulated in Judge Posner's concurrence in United States v.
Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 1988), discussed supra note 46.
151. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 148, at 22.
152. Id.
153. For an interesting article that argues that juries engage in a process of statutory interpretation
much like that used by judges in matching the facts of a case to the law as presented by the judge, see
generally Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of
Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1199 (1998).
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phenomenon, imagine a laboratory manual that contains the following
instructions for mixing an important chemical agent:
1. Carefully pour chemical AAA into a beaker.
2. Then carefully pour twice as much of chemical BBB into the
beaker.
3. Finally, test for purity. If the beaker contains more than 300 parts
of contaminant, destroy the batch. Otherwise, go to step 4....
The problem with this instruction is step 3. It specifies a purity
threshold, but does not say how big the beaker must be. If, for example,
we always use a one liter beaker, and always fill it completely (1/3 AAA
and 2/3 BBB), then we know that the substance must be pure to the extent
of containing fewer than 300 parts of contaminant per liter. But as the
instructions are stated, technicians can use any sized beaker from a milli-
liter to a decaliter, and still pass the purity test if there are fewer than 300
parts of contaminant.
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is subject to the same criticism.
We focus our attention on the expression, "reasonable doubt." But what
about "proof'? If I am right about what we do when, we doubt, proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires the government to tell a story consistent
with the facts that the defendant cannot rebut by showing reasonable
alternatives. This places much more of the burden on the defendant than
the system acknowledges. To continue the metaphor, the standard does not
say how large the proof beaker must be before we measure reasonable
doubt contaminants in the government's story. The risk is that cases based
on questionable evidence can result in convictions.
Consider the following example: An innocent defendant with a
criminal record is accused of holding up a liquor store. At the time of the
robbery, he was home with his wife. The defendant does not testify,
because if he does his record will come out and he will surely be
convicted. His wife does testify, but she is not believed. The
prosecution's case is based on circumstantial evidence, such as the
defendant's car being identified as being near the scene. The jurors are not
thoroughly convinced of the defendant's guilt, but the defendant has given
them no reason to doubt the government's story. I predict that defendants
like this one will be convicted much of the time. I also believe that the
problem is with the reasonable doubt standard, regardless of how
"reasonable doubt" is defined, or whether it is defined at all. The
empirical studies discussed in the previous section suggest that I am
right. 154
154. Judge Posner would reduce the magnitude of this problem by amending the rules of evidence
to exclude impeachment by prior offenses. See FED. R. EViD. 609(a) (allowing evidence of prior
convictions to be introduced to impeach a defendant who takes the stand); Richard A. Posner, An
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Assuming the values discussed in Part II of this Article, the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard was probably fine in the nineteenth
century. It was associated with moral certainty, jury instructions typically
contained the expression "moral certainty," 55 and people knew what
moral certainty meant. 156  But we rarely speak of moral certainty now
except in legal situations. We certainly cannot count on jurors under-
standing the term in the Lockean sense when they do hear it in a
courtroom. '17
A subtle change in the language of reasonable doubt instructions in the
middle of the nineteenth century further supports the point that people
understand proof beyond a reasonable doubt as imposing a burden on
defendants. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, federal courts
generally spoke of a burden of proof "beyond all reasonable doubt,"
"beyond any reasonable doubt," or simply "beyond reasonable doubt."
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" could be seen occasionally, but did not
become the norm until the second half of the nineteenth century. 58
When used as a noun, "doubt" refers either to the state of doubting,
or to evidence that causes one to be in the state of doubting. 59  Compare
the following pair:
I have some doubt about that
I have some doubts about that
The first of these sentences uses "doubt" as a mass noun. Mass nouns,
like water, generally occur only in the singular, and do not take the article,
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1526-27, 1544-45 (1999). This
would make it easier for defendants with criminal records to take the stand to tell their stories, and in
this sense Judge Posner is right. But his suggestion does not, I believe, go far enough. Posner's idea
makes it more plausible for defendants to prove their innocence, but does not address the larger
problem, which is that criminal defendants are not supposed to bear the burden of proving their
innocence in the first place.
155. The most prominent of these instructions, the Webster instruction of Chief Justice Shaw of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320
(1850), is quoted and discussed in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S.
1, 8-12 (1994) (recognizing that the phrase "moral certainty" has fallen out of common usage and
stating that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is an equivalent and more commonly used phrase).
156. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 12-13 (asserting that the phrase "moral certainty," which was
generally understood in 1850, might confuse a modern juror, even though, in Fidelity MutualLife Ass'n
v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902), the Court held that "[piroof to a 'moral certainty'" was an
acceptable substitute for "beyond a reasonable doubt").
157. The Supreme Court has criticized the expression "moral certainty" as a distraction from
evidentiary certainty. Cage v. Lousiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam) (holding that the use of
.moral certainty" rather than "evidentiary certainty" could lead to a finding of guilt based on a degree
of proof below that which is required by the Due Process Clause).
158. See supra note 23. This pattern describes federal courts' use of these expressions in
published opinions. Not all states followed this pattern. See, e.g., Dawson v. Thruston, 12 Va. 132,
138 note, § XII (1808) (using the phrase 'proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis added)).
These variations should not be surprising since there is no reason to believe that they reflect conscious
decisions to use one form over another.
159. I am grateful to Edwin Williams for his analysis of this distinction.
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a; rather, they take some."6 Doubt in this sense conforms to Justice
Scalia's definition, "an uncertain, tentative, or provisional disbelief."'
The second sentence uses doubts as a count noun. Count nouns, like book,
do occur freely in the plural, and take a in the singular and some in the
plural. Doubts as a count noun refers to the facts that cause one to be in
a state of doubting. It would be appropriate to respond to the second
sentence (but not the first) by asking, "What are they?" The expression
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" uses "doubt" as a count noun. Its
focus, therefore, is even more on evidence the defendant has raised to
create doubt in the juror's mind rather than the strength of the
government's evidence.
The most obvious response to all of these arguments is that jurors are
instructed in no uncertain terms that the defendant is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, and that the entire burden of proof rests on the
government. In fact, the presumption of innocence is considered even
more basic to notions of fair play than is the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.'62 This response is correct as far as it goes. But once
again, we should not confuse good intentions with good execution. An
instruction that tells the jury that the government bears the burden of
proving its case does very little unless it says how strong that proof must
be. If the only measure of strength is stated as a function of alternative
stories that one can imagine, then the government's burden is very low
indeed. This explains why, when asked to quantify the minimum level of
certainty needed for a conviction, people respond with much lower thresh-
olds than we believe appropriate. 63 We would like to think that we do
not convict unless the members of the jury are as certain as they can
reasonably expect themselves to be of a defendant's guilt. But traditional
jury instructions do not require that level of certainty.
2. Prototype Effects and Mental Models: Playing "The Price Is
Right".-In a television game show called "The Price Is Right," a panel of
participants is presented with a consumer item, such as a washing machine.
Each must guess the manufacturer's suggested retail price. This might be
160. We understand "I want a water" to mean I want a glass of water, or a bottle of water. That
is, we only use a with water when we are speaking elliptically about a count noun, generally some sort
of container.
161. Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S.Ct. 818, 832 (1998). For further
discussion, see supra note 139.
162. Even those instructions that I criticize here contain perfectly clear statements on the
presumption of innocence and the government bearing the burden of proving the defendant's guilt. See
State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1244 (N.J. 1996) (noting in instructions to the jury that "the
presumption [of innocence] does not fade or extinguish until 12 of you agree that he is guilty of
somethingol").
163. See supra note 101 for an analysis of quantification studies on burdens of proof.
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hard enough, since manufacturers' suggested prices are inflated to allow
retailers to appear to be giving discounts when they charge normal market
prices. What makes the game even harder is that the winner is defined as
the contestant who comes closest to the suggested retail price without
exceeding it. If the price of the washing machine is $398, then $150 beats
$400.
We do not generally conceptualize in terms of maximums or
minimums. Rather, we build models that contain stereotypical information,
sometimes called "prototypes" in the psychological literature."64 Thus,
we think of a $400 washing machine as a washing machine that costs $400,
plus or minus some degree of error that we are willing to tolerate-not a
washing machine whose price cannot exceed $400. Yet, playing The Price
Is Right is exactly what we want jurors to do. We want jurors to convict
the defendant of the most serious charged crime that they are sure the
defendant committed. They should not convict a defendant of a crime they
are not sure he committed, even if the defendant's conduct looks more like
that crime than it does any other choices that the jury has.
To see how this works, it is useful to conduct a thought experiment.
Pretend that you are participating in a study in which the experimenter
shows you a set of pictures, and you have to label each of them either as
a rabbit or a fish. You have no other choices. In addition to showing real
rabbits and real fish, the experimenter shows you something that looks a
little like a rabbit, but is clearly not a rabbit. Nonetheless, it certainly looks
more like a rabbit than a fish. Given the experimental choices, you will no
doubt call this a rabbit because it is closer to being a rabbit than a fish.
In everyday life, we make these sorts of choices all the time. If, for
example, the red traffic lights in a town you are driving through are a
slightly different shade from the ones that you are used to seeing, you will
generalize the off-red signals to the red ones that you know so well, and
stop your car. Our ability to fit new situations into categories characterized
by prototypical situations is not only commonplace but a human strength.
It is what allows us to apply our knowledge of the world to unfamiliar
problems.
Now let us alter our experiment by adding one new instruction. In
addition to telling you that you will be asked to call each of the pictures
either a rabbit or a fish, you are told that if you have any reasonable
doubts about the picture being a rabbit, then you should call it a fish. Now
when you are shown the same picture-the picture of the fictional animal
164. See JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 142, at 190-95 (noting that "many natural categories are
mentally represented by prototypes, i.e., schemata of their most characteristic members"); Elenor
Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 192,
193 (1975) (arguing from experimental evidence that we categorize in terms of prototypes rather than
definitions).
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that resembles a rabbit but isn't a rabbit-you become uncomfortable. You
have in front of you something that looks a lot like a rabbit, but have been
told to call it a fish.
The problem has two solutions. The first is to call it a fish. This is
harmless enough in our thought experiment. But if your answer really
mattered, as it does if you are voting as a member of a jury, you might
gradually convince yourself to disregard those features of the picture that
made you think it was not a rabbit. Over time, you may become willing
enough to call it a rabbit, which certainly seems closer to reality than
calling it a fish. After all, you come to the experiment not only with a
model of a rabbit, but also with a model of a fish. The temptation to call
it a rabbit is increased by the unattractiveness of calling it a fish.
The fact that we assimilate new information into mental models based
on its fit with a category's prototype has been exploited in the legal
literature. For example, Steven Winter has employed prototypically moti-
vated models of the sort used in everyday conceptualization to explain a
host of legal phenomena, from standing doctrine to the well-known "no
vehicles in the park" puzzle. 65 A recent article uses Winter's prototype
analysis to explain difficulties in police brutality prosecutions."6
Prototype analysis has also been recently used to deal with issues of
statutory interpretation 67 and to explain the law of boycotts. 61
Most pertinent here is the substantial evidence that jurors do this as
well. In a very interesting set of studies, psychologist Vicki L. Smith
showed that psychology students participating in a mock jury study were
more likely to convict when the defendant's acts reflected typical attributes
of a crime, even when these attributes did not match the legal definition of
the crime as reflected in jury instructions. 169  For example, subjects
165. H.L.A. Hart first described this puzzle in his 1958 Harvard Law Review article Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-07 (1958). For some recent examples, see STEVEN L. WINTER,
A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: How THE STUDY OF THE MIND CHANGES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE
AND LAW 100-02 (1999) (explaining that a legal rule cannot be understood without the use of
.protypicality, function-based categorization, and normatively infuse judgement"); Steven L. Winter,
The Cognitive Dimension ofthe Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2225, 2256-67 (1989) (discussing the role of narrative, consisting of idealized cognitive models, and
its "prototype effect" on lawmaking) and Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) (analyzing the negative effects of the role of
metaphor as related to the doctrine of standing).
166. See David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional
Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 85-117 (1999).
167. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998)
(employing in part linguistic prototype theory to explain problems in criminal statutory interpretation).
168. See GARY MINDA, BoYcOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE
LEGAL MIND 17-75 (1999) (discussing opposing metaphors of boycotts and the implications of each
cognitive metaphor).
169. See Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law,
17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509 (1993) [hereinafter Smith, Prior Knowledge] ("[V]erdict decisions are
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typically identified a burglary as a crime in which something of value is
taken from a home or apartment after a break-in with a purpose to steal.
In contrast, the legal definition requires that the defendant, "without
authority, knowingly enters a building with intent to commit a felony
therein." 7 ' Smith found it harder to get convictions when some of the
jurors' preconceived attributes were missing, and easy to get convictions
when those attributes were present even though some of the legal elements
were absent. This suggests that jurors will tend to associate facts with
legal categories based on the closest conceptual match to mental models of
the crime that they already possess,'171 as opposed to the jury considering
whether the government has proven each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. The result, if Smith's experiments reflect reality, is that
it should be difficult for the government to convict a guilty defendant of a
crime that is remote from jurors' mental model of the offense with which
the defendant is charged. At the same time, it should be relatively easy for
the government to convict an innocent defendant when the defendant's
conduct, while not meeting all the elements of the crime, comes close to
the jurors' model.
This, I believe, is why, in a celebrated case, the English au pair
Louise Woodward was convicted of second degree murder for having
caused the death of an infant."7 Although the government's case was not
compelling, jurors believed she had done something wrong, and her con-
duct came closer to their model of second degree murder than it did to
their model of innocence. The most significant legal event in the case was
defense counsel's decision not to allow the jury to be charged on invo-
luntary manslaughter."7  Not recognizing the difficulties the jury would
have with the Price Is Right effect, defense counsel assumed that no jury
could possibly convict Woodward of second degree murder based on the
government's seriously flawed case. After the conviction, the trial judge
relieved defense counsel of the consequence of the gamble by reducing the
influenced by people's prototypes of crime categories when they should be based on a set of specific
necessary and sufficient conditions."); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay
Representations ofLegal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 866 (1991) [hereinafter
Smith, Prototypes] (concluding that many jurors are influenced by their own erroneous concepts of what
the prototype of the charged crime should be).
170. This is the definition that Smith uses, see Smith, Prior Knowledge, supra note 169, at 512,
which is taken from the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions. See ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL
§§ 14.05-.06 (2d ed. 1981).
171. Hastie et al., supra note 148, at 22, suggest that this is just what jurors do. They also find,
quite disturbingly, that during deliberations jurors spend very little time discussing burden of proof
issues. See id. at 86-87.
172. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1277 (Mass. 1998).
173. See id. at 1281.
[Vol. 78:105
1999] Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt
verdict to involuntary manslaughter anyway. In a 4-3 decision, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. 74
Moreover, jurors bring to the courthouse more than their prototypes
of individual crimes. They also have prototypes for an innocent defendant.
Films, mystery novels, and television programs frequently show innocent
defendants on trial, only to be acquitted when a hero discovers who really
committed the crime, sometimes getting him to confess on the witness
stand. Real trials, in contrast, are often about the relative weight that
should be given to evidence that suggests guilt and evidence that suggests
innocence. Trials end without the defendant looking like the prototypical
innocent defendant. 75
Prototype effects also explain what is wrong with approaches that
suggest that reasonable doubt be left unexplained, since the words are
simple and jurors (supposedly) know what they mean. Jurors know what
the expression means from folk knowledge of the judicial system. The
expression is not used outside of that context with any frequency. A
review of many instances in which the expression is used in the popular
press shows that it is typically used without any explanation of what the
standard means. 76 Sometimes, the expression is used in a way that
implies that the defense has the burden to create reasonable doubt by
poking holes in the government's case.' n On occasion, prosecutors are
quoted defining reasonable doubt in a way that is unacceptable to the
174. See id. at 1298.
175. As Carlos Gonzalez has brought to my attention, there is a tension between this fact and the
fact that jurors respond differently to various instructions. If these prototype-based models were the
whole story about conceptualization, then it really should make no difference what instruction is used.
Jurors will simply vote consistent with the model that is the best match. Much recent work in the
psychology of conceptualization, however, suggests that prototypes are only part of how we
conceptualize, and should not be seen as anything like a complete explanation. See FODOR, supra note
141. Yet there is also virtually complete consensus that prototype effects are part of our psychology.
For a recent description of current thinking in cognitive psychology, see Edward E. Smith, Concepts
and Categories, in 3 AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THINKING (Edward E. Smith & Daniel
N. Osherson eds., 2d ed. 1995). For my views on this issue, see Solan, supra note 167, at 65-75.
If, as I suggest here, prototype effects reflect only part of how we conceptualize, then one might expect
prototype effects to play some role in jurors' thinking, but not to trump the instructions entirely. And
that seems to be what happens. This makes it all the more important to be concerned about what
instructions the jury actually receives.
176. Typical is the following sort of statement: "They need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
who committed this crime and then seek a death sentence for the killer." Editorial, When a Time to
Kill Has Come, THE INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, May 28, 1998, at A12, available in 1998 WL 8331621.
177. "What the Nichols defense tried to do, really, is to get jurors asking questions, which might
lead them to doubts about the government's evidence, which in turn might leAd to reasonable doubt,
which might lead to a hung jury or an acquittal." Andrew Cohen, Defense Stressed Doubts: But It May
Be Enough to Get Jury to Acquit Ni chols, DENVER POST, Dec. 12, 1997, at A29, available in 1999 WL
13886132; John Dickerson, Four for Four, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 33 (explaining that in the World
Trade Center bombing trial, "defense attorneys cooperated in raising doubts about each part of the
prosecution's reconstruction in hopes of raising reasonable doubt about the overall story").
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courts. 78  Often the expression appears in the press with the implication
that the government has a difficult burden to meet, but without much
more. 179
Thus, while jurors do have a prior model of what reasonable doubt
means, they necessarily built that model the way we all build our own
models: from newspapers, magazines, television, books, and so on. But
most of these sources contain incomplete or inaccurate reports of what
courts demand of the government. Jurors' prototypes for reasonable doubt
may vary significantly from what we really want of our criminal justice
system, just as their prototypes for what it means to have committed
various crimes differ from legal definitions, as Smith demonstrates."s
For this reason, I do not agree with those jurisdictions that are satisfied to
instruct on reasonable doubt and leave the term to the jurors' prior
understanding.
3. Gricean Implicature and the Pressure to Convict.-In a short
article that has generated enormous literature, the philosopher H. Paul
Grice wrote that we routinely and unselfconsciously rely on a standard set
of inferences in understanding speech and, when speaking, assume that the
hearer will rely on this same set of inferences.' 8 ' The core inference is
Grice's cooperative principle: "Make your conversational contribution such
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."" s2 Jurors
hearing instructions, like the rest of us, apply this principle. They assume
that the judge has a purpose in presenting the instructions in the form she
does.
Some of the definitions of reasonable doubt discussed earlier show
how Gricean implicatures can affect the ways in which jurors understand
their jobs. Many instructions tell the jury not to consider "speculative" or
"imaginary" doubts. 18a Such an instruction, while perhaps well-
178. "William Wise, assistant Boulderdistrict attorney, recently likened a 'probable cause' finding
to a 51 percent certainty, while a 'reasonable doubt' threshold would be at least 75 percent." Guy
Kelly & Kevin McCullen, Risk Seen In Grand Jury Probe of JonBenet Case, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar.
15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5572184.
179. "[Acting New York Supreme Court Justice] Tejada said the circumstantial case must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and 'to a moral certainty.'" Barbara Ross, Jury Finds 3 Cops Not
Guilty in Wash. Heights Burglaries, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL
16051189.
180. See supra note 169.
181. See H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTIcS 41 (Peter Cole &
Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
182. Id. at 45.
183. See Walker v. State, 369 So.2d 814, 823-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 So.2d 825 (Ala. 1979); State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1244-45 (N.J. 1996) (discussed
infra note 187).
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intentioned, is tantamount to telling the jury not to consider any doubts at
all. Doubting, after all, is a matter of speculation and imagination. It
requires one to imagine alternative models consistent with the evidence.
A juror hearing such an instruction is likely to draw the inference that the
judge is trying to tell her not to take her doubts too seriously unless they
are extremely strong. Otherwise, the two instructions together would make
no sense, and the judge would be violating the cooperative principle.
Of course, this particular problem can be cured. Jury instructions that
tell jurors not to speculate or imagine can and should be eliminated by trial
judges and jury reform panels, or, if necessary, struck down by appellate
courts." 4 Jurors might still be told that their ability to form outlandish
or very improbable alternative models does not constitute "reasonable"
doubt. Such an instruction would be a far cry from the jury instructions
that I criticize here.
The same problem exists for the instruction that a reasonable doubt "is
proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and
act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own
affairs.""s If typical jurors are anything like me, they always hesitate
before acting in the most important aspects of life. But the judge could not
possibly mean that jurors should never convict because they always hesitate
to act when they make important decisions in their own lives. Thus, a
reasonable juror might infer that the judge must mean that one should not
convict if, after deciding that the defendant is guilty, one still hesitates.
The FJC recognizes this problem with "hesitate to act" instructions in the
commentary to its "firmly convinced" instruction. 6
A related problem comes from instructions that contain many warnings
for jurors not to acquit unless the doubts are very serious ones.'87 Some
contain several statements in which the court tells jurors why not to take
a particular sort of doubt seriously. One of Grice's principles is the maxim
of quantity: An agent will do as much as is required for the achievement
184. Of course, courts that use an undefined reasonable doubt instruction do not have any of the
problems that result from unwanted inferences from the definitions themselves.
185. United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 129 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994). The Williams court
approved the use of Instruction 1.06 of the Fifth Circuit's pattern jury instructions. See id. at 19 n.2;
see also DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL
CASES) 16 (1990).
186. In the decisions people make in the most important of their own affairs,
resolution of conflicts about past events does not usually play a major role.
Indeed, decisions we make in the most important affairs of our lives-
choosing a spouse, a job, a place to live, and the like-generally involve a
very heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking. They are wholly unlike
the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal cases.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 4, No. 21, at 29 (1998).
187. See, for example, the instruction reviewed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v.
Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1244-45 (N.J. 1996).
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of the current goal; an agent will not do more than is required."s The
weight of the instruction conveys a message to the jurors: The judge would
not have presented so many ways in which the juror's doubts can be used
improperly if this were not the main problem to avoid. Such a message is
likely to focus jurors on the strength of the defendant's case as a criterion
for acquittal rather than on whether the government has proven its case
with near certitude.
4. Why the Firmly Convinced Standard Should Work Better.-I have
argued that the expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" tends to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant, leaves the government's burden
unquantified, and is subject to prototype effects that can help the govern-
ment win cases based on weak, but uncontested, evidence. When the proof
shows that a defendant is clearly guilty, none of this matters-there will
generally be a conviction no matter what the standard." 9 It is when the
government's case is less strong that we need to be concerned about these
issues.
Whether stated as a definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
simply as its own standard, expressions like "firmly convinced," "satisfied
that you are sure," and "thoroughly convinced" eliminate some of the
problems and reduce others. What does it mean to convince someone
thoroughly? It means that the speaker has caused the hearer to construct
a mental model that is powerful, and that no alternative models are suitable
alternatives. In other words, it means exactly what the government should
have to do to get a conviction. It must put on a case in which the evidence
favoring its position is strong and in which there are no other reasonable
alternatives. Moreover, the words themselves focus on what the govern-
ment must do-not on what the defendant has been able to accomplish. It
tells jurors not to accept the government's model unless they are convinced
that it is the right one."9  The FJC and New Jersey instructions tell
jurors to keep both sides of the equation in mind, whereas standard reason-
able doubt instructions do not.
As for prototype effects, expressions like "firmly convinced" will still
lead to assimilation of the closest match between the facts and a legal
category, as opposed to matches in which all of the elements are proven.
188. See Grice, supra note 181, at 45-46. For discussion of this maxim and of Grice's work
generally, see GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 89-129
(2d ed. 1996).
189. See generally L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 82, at 219 (noting that the nature of a jury
instruction only takes on significance in borderline cases).
190. "Convince" is what Austin called a "perlocutionary" verb. Its meaning includes the notion
that an utterance has effected a change in the state of mind of the hearer. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To
Do THINGS WITH WORDS 101-02 (2d ed. 1975).
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But by focusing the jury on the government's obligation there should be
some improvement in this regard as well. Moreover, the Gricean problems
endemic in instructions that specify which doubts are reasonable ones are
absent in both the FJC instruction and New Jersey's modified firmly con-
vinced instruction in Medina.9' I do not claim that the firnly convinced
standard is preferable because it is a "good" definition of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is not a definition in the sense that it uses simpler
words to convey the meaning of a more complex concept. If it is a defi-
nition at all, it is a stipulated definition. The superiority of the firmly
convinced instruction comes not from its semantic fidelity to the reasonable
doubt standard but from its greater success in promoting important values.
To lose sight of this point is to accept a formulaic approach to our system
of criminal justice rather than an approach that recognizes the values that
led to the adoption of the reasonable doubt standard in the first place.
Nor do I argue here that courts must eliminate the words "reasonable
doubt" entirely from jury instructions, as some English courts"9 and the
French Code of Criminal Procedure have done."9I The empirical studies
using the FJC instruction, which contains the expression "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt," show that it reduces the rate of conviction when the
evidence is highly equivocal. My argument has been that the standard
instructions misfocus the jury, not that doubting is irrelevant to whether the
government has met its burden of convincing the jury sufficiently. The
concept of reasonable doubt does highlight part of what a jury should
consider in its deliberations. Without further empirical evidence, I have no
reason to conclude at this point that instructions currently used in England
and France are superior to ones that I espouse here. Other possible
instructions, such as "proof so convincing that it leaves no reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt,""9 may also accomplish the same goals.
In this regard, future experimental research directed at these subtle
differences may be useful, even if only to show that at some point, once
the appropriate concepts are conveyed, the precise language begins to
matter less.
A related problem is the status of the intermediate "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" standard. Two of the empirical studies discussed in Part III
191. Again, these problems are also absent from the approach used by the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, in which jurors are told that they must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but are not given
definitions of that term. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
192. See Walters v. Quenn (1969] 2 App. Cas. 26, 30 (P.C. 1969) (appeal taken from Jam.)
(requiring a jury to feel "quite sure" that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused).
193. See FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 353; supra text accompanying note 59; see
also a proposal by Judge Fortunato to this effect, supra note 52.
194. This language is similar to that found in Peter v. Beverly, 35 U.S. 532, 568 (1836) ("[B]ut
the evidence must certainly be so clear and satisfactory, as to leave no reasonable doubt. .. ").
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suggest that it is harder to meet this standard than it is to meet the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 95 The linguistic analysis presented
in this Part predicts that this should be the case. Here, too, further
empirical work would be useful. It appears at this point, however, that our
system is very likely mistaken about the relative burdens that it imposes on
parties in different circumstances. Fortunately, the empirical research also
suggests that changing the burden of proof instructions in criminal cases
along the lines suggested here should correct this problem.
Finally, the approach to burden of proof in criminal cases espoused
here should make it more difficult for defense counsel to argue that the
burden has not been met when the case against the defendant is strong.
Trial advocacy texts traditionally instruct lawyers to focus their summations
on the concept of reasonable doubt.'96 The empirical literature has not
tested the success of this strategy, perhaps because experimental studies
focus on juror reactions to equivocal evidence and reasonable doubt argu-
ments occur during defense counsel's summation. Nonetheless, just as the
reasonable doubt standard seriously disadvantages the innocent defendant
who cannot meet the burden of raising doubts, it may also aid the wealthy
defendant whose counsel is able to raise remote theories of the case that are
entirely unconvincing but create some small level of doubt. The "firmly
convinced" standard should make this more difficult to accomplish.
Particular "doubts" that the defense has raised would be properly integrated
into the jury's analysis of how convincing the case against the defendant
actually is. I advance this conclusion tentatively, since it is not supported
by empirical research. It would not be surprising, however, to find that
both parties in criminal prosecutions take advantage of the distortions that
the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard imposes on the system.
V. Conclusion
The burden that we impose on the government in criminal cases
reflects our society's abhorrence of the conviction of the innocent. The
phrase typically used to ensure that there are very few such convictions,
195. See L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 82; Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 101; supra notes
121-24 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., ALFRED S. JULIEN, JULIEN ON SUMMATION 82-83 (1986) ("The defense has so
many imaginative fundamentals working for it, such as 'My opponent must prove the prosecution's case
beyond a reasonable doubt.' The emphasis should be on the words beyond and doubt." (emphasis in
original)); RICHARD H. LUCAS & K. BYRON MCCOY, THE WINNING EDGE: EFFECTIVE
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION TECHNIQUES FOR LAWYERS 124-25 (1993) (suggesting the use of
analogies to help the jury better understand reasonable doubt); HENRY B. ROTHBLATF, SUCCESSFUL
TECHNIQUES IN THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES § 6.6 (1961) ("Your entire summation is based upon
one premise: the failure of the prosecutor to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. Your argument has been pointed toward raising that doubt in the minds of the jurors.
Therefore, your summation must finish on that note.").
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"proof beyond a reasonable doubt," came into widespread use in the nine-
teenth century. However, these may not be the best words to accomplish
this important jurisprudential goal, at least not unless they are explained in
terms of the government's burden to present convincing evidence. The
biggest problem is that the phrase focuses too much on the defendant's
ability to create alternative mental models and not enough on the
government's obligation to prove its case. Linguistic analysis of the
language supports this proposition, as does a close examination of the
experimental literature.
Most courts in this country continue to seek definitions of which
doubts are properly considered reasonable ones. I recommend that the
Federal Judicial Center's "firmly convinced" standard, as modified by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey,"9 be adopted by those courts that have
not yet done so. While "firmly convinced" is not really a definition of
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it best reflects the idea that defendants
should not be convicted unless the government has proven guilt to near
certitude. Surprisingly few courts have adopted this approach, even though
the FJC's instructions were first published more than fifteen years ago.
Such a change may well be needed to correct a potential imbalance in our
system: Empirical research suggests that it is easier to prove a case beyond
a reasonable doubt than it is to prove a case by clear and convincing
evidence. Empirical research also suggests that this imbalance disappears
when an instruction like the FJC's is used in criminal cases.
It is time for both the states and the federal government to eliminate
unfairness in their criminal justice systems by reforming jury instructions
to reflect the deeply held values that we claim to cherish. France and
England have taken such steps. So should the United States.
197. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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